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The fall of a citadel is a dramatic moment. The stronghold has
long been invested; the siege has endured for months. Parallels have
been dug and gun emplacements mounted; and a grim cannonade has
made breaches in the great wall, behind which the defenders have
errected demilunes, so that the struggle goes on. There is a final heavy
bombardment; the assault goes forward against the main breach, and
the storming party ascends over the corpses of the slain .... I
With these graphic words, Professor William Prosser heralded the New
Jersey Supreme Court decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.2 as
the "fall of the citadel of privity" in the field of product liability litigation.3 The
Henningsen decision, of course, determined that the manufacturer of an
automobile and the automobile dealer could be liable for breach of an implied
warranty of safety without any showing of privity of contract or negligence. 4
Urging the adoption of "a shortcut which makes any supplier in the chain
directly liable to the user," 5 Prosser cited section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts as a vehicle of sound and similar approach. Likewise, he
credited the alacrity with which state courts accepted the Henningsen principle
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2 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
3 Prosser, supra note 1, at 791.
4 Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 84.
5 Prosser, supra note 1, at 799-800.
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of strict liability without negligence and without privity of contract6 as working
"the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the
entire history of the law of torts." 7 Prosser celebrated the fall of the citadel
because the citadel had prevented an entire class of people from seeking
recovery. Strict liability founded upon warranty had traditionally required some
reliance by the plaintiff upon a seller's express or implied assertion and notice
of breach within a reasonable time by the plaintiff-buyer.8 Furthermore,
contractual warranty was subject to disclaimer by the seller. Thus, strict
liability founded upon warranty was restricted by substantive contract
principles. As described by Prosser, it was a "a freak hybrid born of the illicit
intercourse of tort and contract. "9
By comparison, the absence of fanfare with which the United States
Supreme Court has reconstructed a wall of the citadel so neatly undone by
Henningsen and Restatement Section 402A has been striking. The reason for
the relative silence of the tort community may well be that the vehicle for
reconstruction in tort is a decision of the United States Supreme Court in civil
procedure. By interjecting a requirement of "jurisdictional privity" into the
stream of commerce rationale advanced in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson,10 the O'Connor plurality in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court11 has made it virtually impossible for an injured plaintiff to sue a
component parts manufacturer in any state or country other than its place of
domicile or the state or country where delivery of the component part is made
to a product assembler. Put in context, by imposing the requirement of a direct
or tangible relationship between the component parts manufacturer and the state
of the action, a plurality of the Supreme Court has made it virtually impossible
for a plaintiff to sue directly any supplier in the chain. In short, they have
replaced a concept of privity founded in contract with a concept of privity
founded in jurisdiction and reconstructed a wall of the citadel.
In order to understand the concept of jurisdictional privity or appreciate its
significance, it is necessary first to articulate the development of personal
6 The Henningsen court held "that under modem marketing conditions, when a
manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream of trade and promotes its purchase by the
public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it into
the hands of the ultimate purchaser. Absence of agency between the manufacturer and the
dealer who makes the ultimate sale is immaterial." Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 84.
7 Prosser, supra note 1, at 793-94 (footnote omitted).
8 Id. at 801.
9 Id. at 800. By contrast, the concept of strict liability in tort permits a court "to bypass
the traditional warranty requirements of privity and notice and other points which would
appear to be applicable in a cause of action based on warranty." 1A Louis R. FRuMER AND
MELvIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCrS LiAnurry § 3.03[4], at 3-396 and 3-399 (1992).
10 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
11 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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jurisdiction as an overriding rational construct in the analysis of amenability.
Having once done that, the impact of jurisdictional privity becomes
increasingly apparent. Thus, this Article will detail the development of personal
jurisdiction, culminating in a recognition of the concept of jurisdictional
privity. It will then discuss the impact of that concept on the law of products
liability.
It is notable at the outset that, compared with its earlier precedent, 12 the
United States Supreme Court has been prolific in examining questions of
personal jurisdiction 13 since its landmark decision in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson. This recent proclivity has in turn spawned scholarly debate
about whether there exists a coherent doctrine of personal jurisdiction14 and
whether that doctrine ought properly be a matter of constitutional law. 15
Assuming the constitutional rationality of the jurisdictional principles
articulated in Pennoyer v. Neff,16 it is important to establish that the developing
doctrine of in personam jurisdiction was in fact coherent, culminating with the
stream of commerce or make-a-market theory of World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp.17 Furthermore, the stream of commerce or make-a-market theory was
intuitively correct in that it protected and advanced the disparate interests at
stake in long-arm litigation. However, the interpretation of World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp.'s stream of commerce or make-a-market theory, as adopted
by the O'Connor plurality in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,18
constitutes a retreat from the broad parameters of World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. As noted earlier, this retreat is significant first, because it introduces a
requirement of narrowly-defined "jurisdictional privity" and second, because
12 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
13 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991); Burnham v.
Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.
102 (1987); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694 (1982).
14 See, e.g., Wendy C. Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32
B.C. L. REv. 529, 530 (1991).
15 See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal
Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 19
(1990).
16 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
17 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1979).
18 480 U.S. 102, 108-12 (1987).
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second, because that narrowly-defined jurisdictional privity effects a change in
the substantive law of products liability.
A. Jurisdiction: The Concept
Although amorphous in concept, jurisdiction is really nothing more than
governmental power and authority-quite literally, the power to declare the
law. 19 Initial limitations on that power historically have been two-fold: They
are in part territorial, i.e., there is some geographical stopping point to the
power of any given state, and they are in part based on citizenship, which is
largely a question of where an individual is domiciled. These two limitations,
then, have formed the principle of extraterritoriality, 20 that is, the power of
governments is limited generally to jurisdiction over their own territories and
over their citizens within those territories.
Under the American concept of federalism, or sovereign state relationships
in a federal system, the principle of extraterritoriality operates as between the
states. New York and California, for example, are at once sister states and
foreign states, yet each is regarded as sovereign within its own territory and
with respect to its own citizens. Antithetical to the principle of
extraterritoriality is the concept of "full faith and credit" embodied in Article
IV, Section I of the United States Constitution. 21 The Full Faith and Credit
provision, of course, implies that, if rendered by a court possessed of subject
matter and personal jurisdiction, every judgment of that court has an
extraterritorial force such that the same case may not be retried in any other
state in the Union.
The jurisdictional question which occupies any further study in the area is
how strictly or literally territorial limitations are defined in applying the
principle of extraterritoriality. Do such concepts as citizenship or domicile or
the transiency of persons permit an individual to escape the judicial power of a
given state simply by physically leaving it (or for that matter never physically
19 See JONATHAN M. LANDERS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 59 (3d ed. 1992); CHARLES
A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcTccE AND PROCEDURE § 3502 (1984 &
Supp. 1992).2 0 Extraterritoriality implicates both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. See Note,
Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extratenitorial Jurisdiction, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1310 n.2 (1985); see also Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and
Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L. REv. 689, 698-99
(1987).
21 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by
general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved,
and the effect thereof."
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entering it)? The study of long-arm jurisdiction in large measure provides the
answer to this question.
B. Jurisdiction: The Interests
The adequacy of any particular theory, such as the make-a-market theory
advanced in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., depends on its ability to explain
and predict an outcome consistent with protection of the legitimate interests at
stake in long-arm jurisdiction. As a prelude to further discourse on the subject,
therefore, it remains to identify the relevant interests. 22
The state's interest in the exercise of jurisdiction is representative of the
collective interests of its citizens. In that capacity, the state has an interest in
regulating the conduct of anyone whose activities will have substantial impact
upon it. Use of the term "substantial" necessarily implies a determination as to
which conduct is worthy of regulation and which conduct is relegated to a
certain state disinterest. Moreover, critical to this relegation of interests is an
assessment of what is cost-effective. If the impact on the state is small, there is
little interest in regulating that type of conduct and marshalling the forces of the
state to enforce the regulation. On the other hand, if the impact on the state is
substantial, there is a greater interest in regulating such conduct.
The plaintiff likewise has an interest in the judicial power of a given state.
Specifically, the plaintiff's interest is the opportunity to be heard on a claim as
inexpensively as possible. Having to litigate in a foreign forum may be
prohibitive, especially if it involves underwriting travel costs for attorneys and
witnesses. Such costs may even render a victory pyrrhic.
Finally, the interest of the defendant is also critical. That interest is surely
to avoid the risk of a non-meritorious case, but it is also an interest in being
compelled to defend only in a forum where he or she stands a fair chance of
litigating the merits-again, as inexpensively as possible.
22 At least one author has examined these factors incident to whether the exercise of
jurisdiction over a given defendant is reasonable within some greater "fair play and
substantial justice" test. See, e.g., Leslie W. Abramson, Gaifng "Fair Play and
Substantial Justice". How the Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standard for Personal
Jurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 444-68 (1991). In contrast, this author
suggests that such factors have always been relevant in the determination of whether the
contacts of a given defendant with the forum state are qualitatively high enough to support
general or specific jurisdiction. See infra subpart lI.A.
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I. COHERENCY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
A. Pennoyer Through Kulko
In 1877, the United States Supreme Court decided Pennoyer v. Neff,23
which stood for 100 years as the primer for personal jurisdiction. It is this
decision from which the principle of extraterritoriality, which is often referred
to as the "power principle," emanates. 24 The critical issue in Pennoyer was the
amenability of (or sufficiency of the state's relationship to) an absent, non-
resident (non-domiciled) defendant.25 The well-known facts were that Mitchell
had sued Neff, a California domiciliary, in Oregon to recover payment of fees
for legal services Mitchell rendered to Neff. A summons was served on the
absent Neff by publication, and jurisdiction was obtained over Neff on the basis
that Neff owned property in the State of Oregon, although such property was
never attached (or even owned) at the outset so as to establish quasi in rem
jurisdiction. Mitchell took a default judgment against Neff and recovered
damages pursuant to a sheriff's sale of Neff's land. Neff later commenced suit
in Oregon to recover possession of the land as against Pennoyer, the
purchaser. 26
The Supreme Court in Pennoyer acknowledged as "a principle of general,
if not universal, law," 27 that in an action for money or damages, i.e., a
personal action, "where a defendant does not appear in the court, and is not
found within the State, and is not a resident thereof, but has property therein,
the jurisdiction of the court extends only over such property. "28 In making that
statement, the Court implicitly recognized the three traditional bases of in
personam jurisdiction: "appear in court"-consent; "found within the state"-
presence;29 and "resident thereof'-domicile.30 The presence of an individual's
23 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
24 See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, Jurisdiction Over the Foreign Non-Sovereign
Defendant, 19 SAN Dic, o L. REV. 431, 432 (1982). For a general discussion of the origins
of the power theory ofjurisdiction, see Luther L. McDougal III, Judicial Jurisdiction: From
a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1, 2 (1982) and Linda J. Silberman,
Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 44-46 (1978).
25 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734.
2 6 Id. at 716.
2 7 Id. at 720.
28 Id.
29 Presence within the forum as a concept is more commonly referred to as "transient
jurisdiction." Many commentators have criticized this aspect of the Pennoyer decision as
being outdated, inconsistant with later Supreme Court decisions, and potentially
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for
the Transient Rule of the Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REv. 38 (1979); Lea
Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Tx. L. Rav. 723 (1988);
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property within the state would support only in rem or quasi in rem
jurisdiction.
The Court also indicated that the sovereignty of a state would permit the
state to determine for itself the "civil status and capacities of its inhabitants" 31
or domiciliaries, such as rites of marriage, form of contracts, and rights arising
under contract.32 These determinations, of course, necessarily have some extra-
territorial effect. Consistent with the power principle, a state could compel its
domiciliaries, for example, to conform to one type of contract to transfer
property situated beyond the boundaries of the forum state.33 Likewise, a state
could subject real property within its own borders, which might be owned by
non-domiciliaries, to decretal transfer in payment of the demands of its own
citizens. 34
Donald W. Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court's Latest Last Words on State Court
Jurisdiction, 26 EMORY L.J. 739 (1977); Frank R. Lacy, Personal Jurisdic'on and Service
of Summons After Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 OR. L. REv. 505 (1978); Robert A. Sedler,
Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA
L. REV. 1031 (1978); Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53
N.Y.U. L. REV. 33 (1978); David H. Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of the Personam
Jurisdiction-A Speculation of the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 273;
Donald J. Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of
Presence-Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROoK. L. REV. 565 (1979).
However, on May 29, 1990, a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality
of transient jurisdiction in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). The opinion of
Justice Scalia, joined in pertinent part by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and
White, premised Due Process compliance on historical tradition:
The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes
due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define
the due process standard of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
That standard was developed by analogy to "physical presence," and it would be
perverse to say it could now be turned against that touchstone ofjurisdiction.
Id. at 619.
The opinion of Justice Brennan, however, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and
O'Connor, premised Due Process compliance on the fact that "by visiting the forum State, a
transient defendant actually 'avail[s]' himself. . . of significant benefits provided by the
State." Id. at 637.
30 The term "residence" must be distinguished from citizenship or domicile. An
individual may have many residences but is a citizen or domiciliary of only one state at any
given time. See, e.g., Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1974). For a general
discussion of Pennoyer's threefold framework, see Kevin M. Clermont, Restating
Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411
(1981).
31 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 723.
34 Id.
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Vestiges of the power principle remain today in virtually every jurisdiction.
Many personal jurisdiction statutes, for example, delineate the grounds therefor
in terms of consent, presence and domicile.35 The immediate results of
Pennoyer, however, were somewhat bizarre. If the plaintiff had an action on a
debt, i.e., a personal action against a non-resident defendant who could not be
found within the forum state, the plaintiff's options for suing the defendant in
the forum state were severely limited. The first option available to a plaintiff
was completely fortuitous: the plaintiff might wait in the hopes that the
defendant would reappear at some time within the boundaries of the forum
state. If the plaintiff then served the defendant within the boundaries of the
forum state, the defendant would be present and amenable. Of course, if the
statute of limitations happened to run during the interim, the plaintiff might be
barred from pursuing any remedy against that defendant. 36 The second option
could prove expensive: the plaintiff might proceed to the state in which the
defendant could be found and commence an action within the courts of that
state, thus satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of the foreign state. This
required the plaintiff to travel to the foreign state and retain counsel in the
foreign state. However, since subpoena power was likewise restricted to the
geographic boundaries of the forum state,37 plaintiff could not compel the
attendance of witnesses from its "home" state, where all such witnesses were
likely to be, and force them to appear in the courts of the forum state. The third
alternative was only available in cases where the defendant was known to hold
property of significant value in the plaintiff's home state. However, since the
plaintiff could not obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the plaintiff's
case had to be reclassified as an action against the property in which the
plaintiff had to proceed first by attaching the property as if it were an agent for
service of process against the defendant. Moreover, the adequacy of any
remedy provided by this option depended on the value of the defendant's
property. Since quasi in rem jurisdiction gave a court power over the person of
the defendant only to the value of his or her property, such property had to at
35 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-75.4(1)(a)-(c) (1983) and Wis. STAT. § 801.05
(1)(a)-(c) (1988), which have retained presence, consent and domicile as sufficient to confer
general personal jurisdiction; see also ALAsKA STAT. § 09.05.015(1)(A)-(C) (1983); MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROc. CODE ANN. § 6-102(a) (1989).
36 See generally 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actons §§ 10-14 (1987). In some cases,
expiration of the period of limitations would extinguish the right of action as well as the
remedy and even deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.
37 See, e.g., WLs. STAT. § 757.01(1) (1988). There were likewise instances of serving
process on a given defendant while aboard an airplane as the aircraft was navigating




least equal the value of the debt, or else the plaintiff would be required to bring
an action in the defendant's home state for the remaining monies.
One reason the Pennoyer power principle prevailed for so long is that
certain exceptions and modifications were recognized that enabled courts to
exercise jurisdiction over non-consenting non-domiciliaries in many common
kinds of cases. Some were recognized by the decision in Pennoyer itself. Quasi
in rem jurisdiction, for example, extended not only to tangible real or personal
property within the state but also to intangibles such as corporate stock, bank
accounts, and even personal debts owed by a private individual to the
defendant.38
In divorce actions, marital status was considered a res present within the
state, which allowed the courts to determine the interests of all parties in the
marriage, whether domiciled in the forum state or not.39 Thus, there existed a
basis for in rem jurisdiction under the exercise of a state's police power. The
divorce proceeding was viewed as divisible into two aspects: (1) the status,
which could be adjudicated by a court at the domicile of the plaintiff without
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and (2) the property, which could only
be adjudicated by a court which could gain in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant or in rem jurisdiction over the defendant's property.
There were several other crucial decisions which had direct impact upon
the Pennoyer power principle. In Blackmer v. United States,40 the United
38 See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). In that case, Harris owed Balk money,
and Balk owed Epstein money. Harris, a domiciliary of North Carolina, traveled to
Maryland, where Epstein was domiciled. Epstein served Harris with process in Maryland in
order to attach Harris's debt to Balk. Maryland's long-arm statute provided for attachment
of the debt if a debt of the debtor was found within the jurisdiction of the state of Maryland
and the court obtained personal jurisdiction over the debtor by serving process on him in
that state. The Maryland court adjudicated Balk's debt to Epstein and ordered Harris to pay
Epstein the money he owed Balk in satisfaction of Balk's debt to Epstein. Balk later
collaterally attacked the judgment of the Maryland court, arguing that the Maryland court
lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Supreme Court upheld the Maryland judgment,
however, noting that "the obligation of the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies
[the debtor] wherever [the debtor] goes." Id. at 222. Because Harris's debt to Balk (the
intangible property) was unrelated to the claim Epstein had against Balk, the consequence of
this decision was to make a person, here Balk, generally amenable or subject to general
personal jurisdiction in any forum in which his debtor could be found.
39 Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared
and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REv. 279, 286 (1983); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General
Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REv. 610, 618 n.35 (1988); Julia M. Carpenter, Note, Miller v.
Kite: Should Domestic Disputes Require the Maximum of Minimum Contacts?, 64 N.C. L.
REV. 825, 835 (1986); Thomas C. Mundell, Comment, Securing Personal Jurisdiction Over
Nonresidents in Spousal and Child Support Suits: Is California's Long-Arm Too Short?, 17
SAN Dio L. REv. 895, 901-02 (1980).
40 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
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States Supreme Court ruled in a federal context that a personal judgment (here
a fine) could be taken against a non-resident citizen of the United States simply
by reason of that person's citizenship. Blackmer was wanted as a witness in a
criminal prosecution arising out of the Teapot Dome scandal. Congress had
passed a statute which permitted service of a subpoena on Blackmer, who was
hiding out in Paris. Blackmer was served, but when he failed to appear, he was
held in contempt and fined, and his property in the United States was seized to
satisfy the fine. In a subsequent action to regain title to the property, the
Supreme Court upheld the imposition of the fine, despite the contention that the
United States had no jurisdiction over Blackmer in Paris. The Court reasoned
that a country may summon and demand the presence of its citizens no matter
where they may reside.41
That principle was extended in Milliken v. Meyer42 to include state
citizenship and ordinary civil actions. Milliken established the prevailing rule
41
Nor can it be doubted that the United States possesses the power inherent in sovereignty
to require the return to this country of a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the
public interest requires it, and to penalize him in case of refusal .... It is also beyond
controversy that one of the duties which the citizen owes to his government is to
support the administration of justice by attending its courts and giving his testimony
whenever he is properly summoned.
Blacklner, 284 U.S. at 437, 438 (citations omitted).
42 311 U.S. 457 (1940). Here, Milliken brought suit against Meyer in Meyer's home
state of Wyoming. Meyer, however, was temporarily residing in Colorado, and Milliken
served him with Wyoming process in Colorado. Meyer refused to appear in Wyoming and
defaulted. The Wyoming court issued a personal judgment against Meyer for certain
monies. Later, Meyer sued Milliken in Colorado for the return of those monies. Milliken
invoked the Full Faith and Credit Clause in defense, and the Supreme Court ruled that the
Colorado court was bound by the Wyoming judgment because Meyer was a domiciliary of
Wyoming at the time of service. Commenting upon the reciprocal responsibilities attendant
to state citizenship, the Court noted that the state of domicile may require its citizens to
appear and defend cases even when they are absent from the forum state or temporarily
residing elsewhere. The Court stated:
Certainly then Meyer's domicile in Wyoming was a sufficient basis for that
extraterritorial service. As in case of the authority of the United States over its absent
citizens (Blaclaner v. United States, 284 U.S. 421), the authority of a state over one of
its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state. The state
which accords him privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue
of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties. "Enjoyment of the privileges of
residence within the state, and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws,
are inseparable" from the various incidences of state citizenship. . . . The
responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of the relationship to the state which domicile
creates. That relationship is not dissolved by mere absence from the state. The attendant
duties, like the rights and privileges incident to domicile, are not dependent on
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that a state has extra-territorial power to summon its citizens, i.e., its
domiciliaries, from wherever they may be to return to the forum state in order
to defend an action commenced there against them.
Other than these two decisions, the dictates of Pennoyer v. Neff persisted
largely unimpaired until the decision in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.43 There was, however, one exception-the decision in Hess v.
Pawloski,44 but that decision is difficult to rationalize from existing precedent.
The decision in Hess v. Pawloski was clearly prompted by the increase in
interstate vehicular traffic. As such traffic increased, state after state became
increasingly concerned with hit-and-run foreign motorists who would enter the
forum state, cause a traffic accident, and escape to a foreign state, rendering
themselves immune from civil prosecution under Pennoyer.
Clearly, the Supreme Court had to become legally inventive in deciding
Hess. The Hess Court stated that when Massachusetts, like many other states,
enacted its non-resident motor vehicle statute, a statute that declared that every
person who used the state highways appointed the Motor Vehicle
Commissioner as his or her agent for service of process, there existed an
implied consent on the part of every non-resident motorist to create that
agency. 45 The Supreme Court, of course, ignored the premise of agency law
that any person who appoints a special agent can revoke the agency, and stated
that Massachusetts had a preeminent authority under its police power to enact
such a statute, which was reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of
all persons who used its highways. 46 It therefore justified the creation of
implied consent by reference to the police power of the state.47 Motor vehicles
were inherently dangerous machines whose use in a state could thus reasonably
be regulated as against non-residents and residents alike.
As applied to natural persons, Pennoyer probably made a great deal of
sense because natural persons have natural domiciles to which they confine the
continuous presence in the state. One such incident of domicile is amenability to suit
within the state even during sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and
employed a reasonable method for apprising such an absent party of the proceedings
against him.
Id. at 463-64.
43 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
44 274 U.S. 352 (1927).45 Id. at 356.
46 Id. Defendant probably could not successfully revoke the agency, however, simply
by affixing a sign to his bumper stating, "My operation of this vehicle within this state does
not constitute the appointment of any person as my agent for service of process." The
decision in Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) stood for the rather dubious
proposition that states had the power to exclude a non-resident motorist who failed to sign a
"consent" document from the jurisdiction. Such a disclaimer would therefore have been to
no avail.
47 Hess, 274 U.S. at 356.
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bulk of their activities. However, unlike natural persons, corporations are
fictive legal persons which have no tangible presence and exist only in the
contemplation of the law.48 Inasmuch as corporations could be enfranchised by
a particular sovereign state, however, they could be recognized as domiciliaries
of the particular state of incorporation, consistent with the Pennoyer power
principle. Yet this concept of corporate domicile became deceptive, especially
when states like Delaware enacted liberal general corporation laws which
balanced a maximum number of enabling provisions against a minimum
number of responsibilities to creditors, shareholders or the public. 49 The result
was that by 1932, "[fjor some 42,000 corporations, including more than one-
third of the industrial corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
Delaware was 'home.'" 50
Moreover, as economic activity became more commonly transacted in the
form of corporate business carried on in foreign non-domicile states, it became
necessary for courts to provide for suits by and against corporate entities in
those foreign states. Thus, there evolved a consent theory of jurisdiction over
foreign corporations, 51 which served as a valid basis for in personam
jurisdiction in both federal and state courts. 52 This theory was predicated on
the maxim that the state could extract consent to be sued (in the form of
appointment of an agent for service of process) as a condition of doing
48 This notion was advanced early on by Chief Justice Taney in Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 517, 588 (1839):
[A] corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by
which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of the law; and
where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have
no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another
sovereignty.
4 9 See also Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corporation Law of
1899, 1 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 249, 271-75 (1976). See generally S. Samuel Arsht, A History of
Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 1, 20-22 (1976); Comment, Lavfor Sale:
A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861, 862-63 & n.8
(1969).
50 Seligman, supra note 49, at 275. The author goes on to note that "[i]n one office
alone of the Industrial Trust Building in Wilmington, 12,000 separate corporations claimed
their existence; and in the lobby of that very same building, 12,000 separate corporations
posted their names in identical picayune lettering in a determined attempt to comply with
the General Corporation Law's requirement that a corporate sign be 'displayed.'" Id. at
275-76.
51 See Edward W. Cleary & Arthur R. Seder, Jr., Extended Jurisdictional Bases for
the llinois Courts, 50 Nw. U. L. REv. 599, 600 (1955).
52 See, e.g., Railroad Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 65, 81-82 (1870); Ex Parte
Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1877).
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corporate business within the forum state.53 As stated by Mr. Justice Curtis for
a nearly unanimous Court in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French:54
A corporation created by Indiana can transact business in Ohio only with the
consent, express or implied, of the latter State . . .This consent may be
accompanied by such conditions as Ohio may think fit to impose; and these
conditions must be deemed valid and effectual by other States, and by this
court, provided they are not repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United
States .... 55
Specific limitations on any accompanying conditions of consent and the judicial
impetus for "consent to do business" statutes were later set forth in St. Clair v.
Cox:56
The State may . . . impose as a condition upon which a foreign
corporation shall be permitted to do business within her limits, that it shall
stipulate that in any litigation arising out of its transactions in the State, it will
accept as sufficient the service of process on its agents or persons specially
designated; and the condition would be eminently fit and just. And such
condition and stipulation may be implied as well as expressed. 57
Although the consent theory of corporate amenability continued to be
operative in the Supreme Court as late as 1933,58 logical difficulties with the
theory59 prompted the emergence of the presence doctrine, 60 whose evolution
53 For a thorough discussion of in personam jurisdiction over corporations during this
era, see generally Philip B. Kurland, 77w Supreme Court, the Due Process lause and the
In Personam Juris'ction of State Courts from Pennoyer to Denckla" A Review, 25 U. CmI.
L. REV. 569, 577-86 (1958).
54 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
55 Id. at 407.
56 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
5 7 Id. at 356.
58 See Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court of
Washington, 289 U.S. 361, 364 (1933).
59 Professor Philip Kurland develops the logical fallacies inherent in the evolution of
the consent doctrine, making much of the Supreme Court's disparate treatment of corporate
in personam jurisdiction based upon "implied consent" to be sued and that based upon
"true" consent secured by the actual appointment of an agent for service of process within
the forum state. For a pointed discussion of this and other conceptual problems attendant to
the "consent" doctrine, see Kurland, supra note 53, at 579-82.
60 See Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) ("A
foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence of
consent, only if it is doing business within the State in such manner and to such extent as to
warrant the inference that it is present there."); Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S.
100 (1898); New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U.S. 138 (1884).
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followed a similar fate. Unlike the predecessor consent theory, the presence
doctrine required an examination of the intrastate activities of the foreign
corporation in order to ascertain the corporation's presence and hence its
amenability. 61 Moreover, the presence theory would sustain personal
jurisdiction over foreign corporations regardless of whether the claims arose
out of business transacted within the forum state, though a cessation of business
would preclude any later assertion of amenability. 62 Perhaps the most cogent
statement of the presence theory, and one which likewise exposed its fallacy, is
contained in the opinion of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Hutchinson
v. CGase & Gilbert, Inc.,63 written by Judge Learned Hand:
It scarcely advances the argument to say that a corporation must be
"present" in the foreign state, if we define that word as demanding such
dealings as will subject it to jurisdiction, for then it does no more than put the
question to be answered....
When we say, therefore, that a corporation may be sued only where it is
"present," we understand that the word is used, not literally, but as shorthand
for something else.... There must be some continuous dealings in the state of
the forum; enough to demand a trial away from its home.
This last appears to us to be really the controlling consideration, expressed
shortly by the word "presence," but involving an estimate of the
inconveniences which would result from requiring it to defend, where it has
been sued. We are to inquire whether the extent and continuity of what it has
done in the state in question makes it reasonable to bring it before one of its
ourts.... This does not indeed avoid the uncertainties, for it is as hard to
judge what dealings make it just to subject a foreign corporation to local suit,
as to say when it is "present," but at least it puts the real question, and that is
something.64
Adopting a result-oriented approach, the courts thus used either the consent
or the presence theory, depending upon which would support jurisdiction over
the particular non-resident corporation. 65 As applied, however, each theory
posed some difficulty since it was necessary to decide whether a corporation
was "doing business" within the forum state in order to ascertain whether the
corporation's consent could be properly implied or whether it was in fact
"present." 66 Thus, case law focused increasingly on the meaning of "doing
61 See Cleary & Seder, supra note 51, at 600.
62 Kurland, supra note 53, at 583.
63 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
64 Id. at 141.
65 Kurland, supra note 53, at 584.
66 Id.; see also Louis P. Haffer, Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations as
Defendants in the United States Supreme Court, 17 B.U. L. REv. 639, 643-44 (1937)
("From the oft-repeated assertion in the cases which have adopted the presence theory that
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business," resulting in a substitution of that conclusory criterion for the earlier,
more reasoned theories. 67
Furthermore, in the absence of corporate domesticity or appointment of a
corporate agent for service of process pursuant to a consent statute,68 it was
difficult to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that was technically
absent from the forum state. Although a corporation might flood a market with
its products, if it (1) had no offices or general agents within the forum state; (2)
made no contracts within the forum state;69 (3) received no monies in payment
for goods in the forum state;70 and (4) held title to no property within the
forum state, it transacted no business in the forum state which might render it
amenable to suit. It was thought that a corporation which had so insulated itself
was a foreign corporation, entitled to the protection of Pennoyer v. Neff.
In such a manner, International Shoe Corporation claimed that it had
effectively insulated itself and was therefore subject to the protections of
Pennoyer. International Shoe was a Delaware corporation with its principal
'the corporation must be doing business in the state under such circumstances as to warrant
the inference that it is present there' it would seem to follow that a corporation is not
'present' within the jurisdiction when its transactions do not quite approach the 'doing of
business' necessary to render it amenable to the service of process.") (quoting Philadelphia
& Reading R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1916)).
67 The doing business test itself became a mechanical exercise in which jurisdiction
depended more on the similarity of facts with decided cases than with the reasonableness or
fairness of requiring the defendant to appear. See Cleary & Seder, supra note 51, at 600-
01; Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REv. 809, 810-12 (1935).
68 Author Louis Haffer examined the problem of jurisdiction over foreign corporations
under the then-extant consent statutes. See Haffer, supra note 66, at 648-49.
69 The "place of the making" of the contract is the place where the last act necessary
to make a binding contract has occurred, and is traditionally the place where the acceptance
becomes effective. See, e.g., 1 ARTHuR L. CORBIN, CONTRACrS § 78 (1963);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICr OF LAWs § 332 (1971).
70 Ile United States Supreme Court in International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S.
579 (1914), confronted the issue whether International Harvester's method of carrying on its
affairs in Kentucky constituted "doing business" within that state such that service of
process upon its agent rendered it amenable to suit. The Court concluded that the
company's "continuous course of business in the solicitation of orders which were sent to
another State and in response to which the machines of the Harvester Company were
delivered within the State of Kentucky" were sufficient to hold it responsible under the
process of the Kentucky state courts. Id. at 585. Distinguishing the case at bar, however,
from its earlier decision in Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., 205 U.S. 530
(1907), the Court was careful to note that the instant case involved more than mere
solicitation: "In the case now under consideration there was something more than mere
solicitation. In response to the orders received, there was a continuous course of shipment
of machines into Kentucky. There was authority to receive payment in money, check or
draft, and to take notes payable at banks in Kentucky." International Harvester, 234 U.S. at
587 (emphasis added).
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place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. It made no contracts in the State of
Washington; all shoes were shipped f.o.b. from outside Washington;
purchasers made no payments to salesmen inside the state but instead sent
payments to the corporate home office in St. Louis; there existed no corporate
offices in the state, and the only employees were commissioned salesmen-that
is, the employees were simply soliciting agents, not general agents possessed of
any power to bind. 71 International Shoe therefore claimed that its contacts were
insufficient to establish a presence within the State of Washington, i.e., the
corporation was not doing business in the State of Washington and could not be
amenable to suit in that state consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court responded to that argument by suggesting that the
concepts of presence and doing business must give way to the reasonableness
test of the Due Process Clause.72 It defined that reasonableness test as follows:
"[I]n order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam ... he [must]
have certain minimum contacts ... such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" 73 Thus was
born the "minimum contacts" test. The language of International Shoe,
however, did not entirely supplant the power principle of Pennoyer v. Neff.
The Court explains:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personan is
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his
presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding him.... But now that the capias
ad respondendwn has given way to personal service of summons or other form
of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. "74
71 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313-14 (1945).
72
I'he terms 'present' or 'presence' am used merely to symbolize those activities of the
corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process. ... Those demands may be met by such contacts of the
corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit
which is brought there.
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17 (citation omitted).
73 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
74 Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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International Shoe therefore did not and does not affect the principles of
domesticity or citizenship-they remain a vestige of the power principle.
However, it redefines the power principle's concepts of consent and presence
and substitutes instead the minimum contacts test or fundamental fairness test
for the traditional concepts of presence and doing business. Consistent with the
notion of presence advanced earlier by Learned Hand,75 the Court explains that
the concept of presence is merely a symbol of a certain quantity and quality of
activity by the defendant in the forum state which is sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process of law. Thus, International Shoe affected the symbolic
notion of presence as outlined by Pennoyer. It focused on the activities of the
defendant in the forum state in every case in which the defendant was not
domesticated, i.e., cases in which it was not a citizen or incorporated.
Moreover, the Court's opinion in International Shoe recognized a range of
activities determinative of amenability that had been represented by prior cases
which it now sought to examine in light of this reasonableness standard. It
found essentially that those cases fell into three categories, dependent upon two
factors: (1) a frequency criterion: how continuous and systematic the subject's
contacts with theforum state, and (2) a relatedness criterion: whether contacts
with the forum state "[gave] rise to the obligations or liabilities sued on." 76
The Court thus sought to structure amenability. There were maximal contacts-
continuous and systematic activity which supported amenability, whether or not
the activity was related to a given claim, i.e., general amenability. There were
also minimal contacts-casual and isolated activities which were unrelated to
the claim, which resulted in no amenability as between the defendant and the
forum state. Finally, there were minimum contacts-isolated contacts which
were qualitatively sufficient to support a related claim. 77 It was these minimum
contacts which supported specific amenability. Moreover, the Court seemed to
suggest that it would examine at least two factors to assess the quality of the
contacts and thus whether such contacts would support a related claim: (1) the
interest of the state in regulating activities of the kind at issue, and (2) the
inconvenience to the defendant-whether it was reasonable in view of the
defendant's activities to require the defendant to appear and defend in the forum
state.78 As time went on, the Supreme Court increasingly looked to the
existence of specific jurisdictional statutes as evidence of a state's particularized
interest in the conduct of the defendant. 79
75 See infra p. 423-24 and accompanying notes.
76 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
7 7 Id. at 318.
7 8 Id. at 317-18.
79 See, e.g., Kulko v. California Supreme Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978) ("California
has not attempted to assert any particularized interest in trying such cases in its courts by,
e.g., enacting a special jurisdictional statute."); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
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Use of the term "minimum contacts" in describing requirements of the Due
Process Clause suggested to some courts that attention should focus on a
defendant's physical contacts or connections with the forum state.80 There were
two principal reasons for this: Q) ease of inquiry-if no demonstrable physical
activity could be traced to the defendant, then the court could conclude that the
defendant lacked even minimum contacts and the case could be dismissed
without further inquiry, and (2) the persistence of territorial power thinking.
Another approach adopted by the courts looked broadly to the fairness of
requiring the defendant to defend a particular suit brought by the plaintiff in the
forum.81 Thus, there might be cases in which jurisdiction would be proper,
even though the defendant had only a remote connection to the forum, if the
factors favoring that forum were strong enough. As the Court noted in
International Shoe,
Whether due process is satisfied must depend... upon the quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause does
not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment inpersonwn against
an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties,
or relations.
82
Then, in McGee v. International Life Insurance Company,83 the Supreme
Court upheld a California state court's jurisdiction over a Texas insurance
company whose only physical contacts with California were (1) solicitation by
mail to insure one California resident, and (2) acceptance by the company of
premium payments from the client for a two-year period, which payments were
mailed from California. Otherwise, the company had no office or agent in
California and solicited no insurance business in California. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction premised upon a specific California statute
on grounds that the suit was based on a contact which had "substantial
connection with that State."'84 The Court looked to the needs of the state to
U.S. 220, 224 (1957) ("The [California statute] did nothing more than to provide petitioner
with a California forum to enforce whatever substantive rights she might have against
respondent.").
80 See, e.g., Davis v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1988);
Rambo v. American S. Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1988); Aaron Ferer & Sons Co.
v. American Compressed Steel, 564 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1977).
81 American Land v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij, 710 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir.
1983); Leney v. Plum Grove Bank, 670 F.2d 878, 880 (10th Cir. 1982); Forum
Publications, Inc. v. P. T. Publishers, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 236, 247 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. v. Feldman, 480 F. Supp. 1307, 1312 (S.D. Tex.
1979).82 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
83 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
84 Id. at 223.
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regulate insurance solicitation in its borders and the relative convenience of
requiring a business to defend itself in a state where it engages in economic
activity. The Court said, therefore, that this isolated contact was qualitatively
sufficient to support amenability with respect to the related claim. It was, of
course, the defendant in McGee who had targeted the plaintiff (who was at the
time physically located within the particular forum state of California) for its
activities. Thus the Court utilized a methodology for assessing minimum
contacts which later found favor in such cases as COlder v. Jones.
85
Those who saw McGee as a resolution of the issue of whether physical
contacts or general balance of fairness should control amenability were
85 465 U.S. 783 (1984). Although perhaps more notorious for its impact on the law of
libel, the Calder case is significant as well for its impact on the law of personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiff Shirley Jones had commenced an action in the California courts for libel against the
National Enquirer, Inc. (a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in
Florida), the magazine's local California distributor, and two Florida domiciliaries: Ian
Calder, the president and editor of the National Enquirer who oversaw the corporation's
functions and in particular approved and edited the libelous article, and John South, a
reporter who wrote the libelous story. Personal jurisdiction was challenged only by the two
individuals who moved to quash service of process on grounds that their contacts with
California were minimal and thus insufficient to meet the demands of due process. Calder,
for example, had no physical contact with California other than one pleasure trip prior to
the publication of the article and one business trip afterwards to testify in an unrelated trial.
South, on the other hand, made many visits per year to California but only one questionable
visit related to the story.
In determining that jurisdiction existed as to both individual defendants, the United
States Supreme Court relied on none of the separate and independent contacts between the
individual defendants and the forum state of California. See id. at 785-86 n.4 & 787 n.6.
Instead, it premised jurisdiction over both defendants on the "'effects' of their Florida
conduct in California." Id. at 789. However, the Court was careful to distinguish this
"effects" test from that "foreseeable effects" test earlier discredited in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-97 (1980). Unlike the random
foreseeability that a product might enter the forum state of Oklahoma in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., the conduct of South and Calder, and hence its effect, were targeted at
plaintiff Shirley Jones in the forum State of California:
[P]etitioners are not charged with mere untargeted negligence. Rather, their intentional,
and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California. Petitioner South
wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article that they knew would have a potentially
devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew that the brunt of that injury would
be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in which the
National Enquirer has its largest circulation.
Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90. Thus, the targeted effect of the conduct of South and Calder in
the instant case was similar to that of the defendant insurer in McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) discussed supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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disappointed with the ensuing decision in Hanson v. Denclda.86 The
amenability issue in that case centered around the contacts between a Delaware
trust company and the forum state of Florida. Although the trust company had
no office in Florida, maintained no general agents in Florida, administered no
trust assets in Florida, and solicited no business in Florida, it did mail income
to the settlor, Mrs. Donner, in Florida. It also received instructions from her,
while she was domiciled in Florida, concerning the exercise of the powers of
appointment under the trust. These contacts with the forum state of Florida,
however, did not qualify as minimum contacts because they arose simply by
virtue of the unilateral activity of the settlor in moving from Pennsylvania to
Florida. The Court noted that "[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum state .... [I]t is essential in each case that there be some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws." 87 As distinct from McGee, where the defendant's
insurance solicitation targeted an individual within the forum state, Hanson
dealt with a pure customer transfer. The relationship of the trustee to the trust
had been fully established before Mrs. Donner moved to Florida. Moreover,
the claim was not related to the trustee's activities within the forum state
because the primary substantive question to be decided by the state court
incident to the claim was not the propriety of the exercise of the power of
appointment but the validity of the trust, and that trust had been fully created in
Pennsylvania, not in Florida. The rule of Hanson thus identified a particular
due process limitation on the exercise of personal jurisdiction that had never
before been articulated. The Hanson Court also recognized that in determining
the overall fairness (i.e., quality/convenience) of subjecting a defendant to
jurisdiction in the forum state, it is essential that the connection to the state be
the foreseeable result of the defendant's own conduct-not simply the unilateral
activity of the plaintiff or some tangential third party. Thus, voluntariness and
foreseeability, not physical impact, became the preeminent considerations for
due process purposes.
86 357 U.S. 235 (1958). States such as Wisconsin treated the decision in Hanson more
as an aberration confined to its own facts. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted in Hasley
v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 235 N.W.2d 446, 457 (Wis. 1975): "Hanson is best
viewed as an application of the due process standard to a particular factual situation ....
This view would also qualify the statement in Hanson that: '[lit is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.'" (citations omitted) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).87 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
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Without Hanson's purposeful-activity limitation upon the nonresident
trustee's amenability, the trustee would be amenable anywhere its client chose
to relocate, unless it made a decision to sever ties with that client. Moreover,
such a defendant could never assess its amenability by gauging the impact of its
own activities, since its activities would not control. Hanson, however, stood
for twenty years as the only case in which the Supreme Court denied a state's
efforts to exercise in personam jurisdiction, and came to be regarded as "a
curiosity," 8 8 largely because its restriction on jurisdiction was justified as "a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States." 89
Then, in 1978, the Supreme Court decided the case of Kulko v. Superior
Court,90 another minimum contacts case that analyzed activities that might
support amenability consistent with due process of law. That case involved an
attempt by a divorced California mother to establish a Haitian divorce decree
incorporating a New York custody agreement as a California judgment, so as
to modify its custody and support provisions within the state of California. The
California state courts had upheld jurisdiction over the New York father either
because he had "caused an effect in the State" 91 of California when he
permitted a daughter to move to California permanently to reside with her
mother and consented to the son's relocation there, or because, under the
circumstances, it was fair and reasonable for the California courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction.92
This case was significant because it posed the question that had troubled
courts and commentators since McGee and Hanson were decided. Under
McGee's general fairness approach, the California courts seemed to be correct.
Although the defendant father had no personal contact with California, he was
nevertheless a party to an arrangement with a substantial California connection:
a parent-child relationship with children residing in California. The California
courts believed that the defendant had purposefully availed himself of the laws
of the State of California because he had caused certain "effects" within the
State of California which resulted from activity outside the state. The California
courts relied upon a "foreseeable effects" test to satisfy the purposeful, forum-
related activity requirement of Hanson. In particular, the defendant had actively
consented to his daughter's living in California, had bought her plane ticket to
live there and had derived a financial benefit by virtue of his daughter's
8 8 See Stewart Jay, "Minimwn Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction:
A Reappraisal, 59 N.C. L. REV. 429, 439 (1981); see also Martin B. Louis, The Grasp of
Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C. L. REv. 407, 408 (1980).89 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251.
90 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
91 Id. at 89.
92 Id.
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presence in California for nine months out of the year. When reviewed by the
United States Supreme Court, however, these contacts were deemed
insufficient to establish the defendant's amenability in California because they
arose out of the defendant's personal, domestic relations: "A father who
agrees, in the interests of family harmony and his children's preferences, to
allow them to spend more time in California than was required under a
separation agreement can hardly be said to have 'purposefully availed himself'
of the 'benefits and protections' of California's laws." 93 Moreover, the
Supreme Court noted that the effects test, on which California had relied,
derived from the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, which covers only wrongful
activity outside the state causing injury within the state, or commercial activity
affecting state residents.94 Furthermore, the mother's claim was adjudged
unrelated to the father's contacts with the forum state of California because, as
in Hanson, the separation and custody agreement, which had been incorporated
into the Haitian divorce decree, was wholly devised before the plaintiff ever
entered the forum state of California. 95
The Kulko decision can be easily rationalized by suggesting that there are
some contacts which are of a purely personal nature from which a defendant
derives no economic or commercial benefit. These activities are relatively
protected by First Amendment privacy interests and, in the absence of some
specific statute expressing the state's overriding concern, the state has a relative
disinterest in such activities. Thus, Ku/ko accepts the Hanson principle that in
order for the exercise of a state's jurisdiction over a particular defendant to be
fair and reasonable, there must be some contact with the forum state by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the laws and protections of the forum
state, which is not simply the unilateral activity of a resident who claims some
relationship to the defendant. Furthermore, matters such as custody between
separated or divorced parents, in the absence of a decree in that state or other
statute evidencing state interest and hence a high quality, are relatively
protected by First Amendment privacy guarantees. These are matters in which
the state interferes only hesitantly. Thus, to a great extent, there evolved a
model for in personam jurisdiction which was at once rational, constitutionally
limited, and flexible.
B. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.: The Make-A-Market Test
The evolution of in personam jurisdiction continued coherently with the
1980 Supreme Court decision in the landmark case World-Wide Volkswagen
93 Id. at 94.
94 Id. at 96.
95 Id. at 97.
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Corp. v. Woodson,96 a product liability suit to redress injuries caused by
defective design and placement of the Audi gas tank. In that action, the
plaintiffs had joined as defendants the German auto manufacturer (Audi NSU
Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft), the importer (Volkswagen of America, Inc.),
the regional distributor serving the northeast tri-state area of New York, New
Jersey and Connecticut (World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation) and the New
York retail dealer (Seaway Volkswagen, Inc.), from whom plaintiffs (the
Robinsons) had purchased the automobile in question. Plaintiffs were en route
from New York to Arizona when they were hit by another vehicle in
Oklahoma causing their car to explode and bum.
Of the defendants named, only the regional distributor (World-Wide
Volkswagen) and the retail dealer (Seaway) challenged the court's personal
jurisdiction. Each entered a special appearance and argued that due process was
violated in requiring it to appear and defend a tort action in Oklahoma when
there existed no contacts between the particular defendant and the forum state
of Oklahoma.
In determining that the two defendants in question were amenable, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court utilized the foreseeable effects rationale, i.e., the
defendants should have foreseen the possibility of a harmful effect in the forum
state because of the mobility of automobiles and because of the substantial
economic benefit each derived from goods ultimately used and consumed in the
state of Oklahoma. The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected that
analysis and announced that foreseeability alone was not sufficient to create
amenability. 97 The Court noted that it was "not the mere likelihood that a
product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there." 98 The Court then formulated a test to
assess whether defendants had purposefully availed themselves of the laws and
protections of the forum state: do they make an effort to serve, directly or
indirectly, the market for their product in the forum state?99 In the words of the
Court,
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or
Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of
the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for
its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of
96 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
9 7 1d. at 295.




those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of
injury to its owner or to others. 100
This make-a-market theory, as tested by the downstream theory of
commerce explained below, has become and should remain the talisman for
constitutional assessment. It accounts for the common-sense reality of product
distribution in the marketplace and accommodates the interests inherent in the
exercise of jurisdiction.°10
In concluding that no market for their product was intended by the
defendants in Oklahoma, the Court observed, "[n]or does the record show that
they regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or
residents or that they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve the
Oklahoma market.' 02 Volkswagen of America and Audi, of course, did not
challenge amenability because of the likelihood that they would have been
amenable in Oklahoma through a distributor or dealer who exploited and
served the Oklahoma market. Most significant to the assessment here,
however, is that the Court suggested a methodology to ascertain whether a
defendant has attempted to make a market in a particular forum. The Court
looked to the activities of the people to whom the defendant sold its product,
i.e., the downstream market.10 3 The process begins, therefore, by looking at
the conduct of the particular defendant, whose amenability is disputed,
proceeding down through the commercial chain, culminating with placement of
the product in the forum. As long as the product finds its way into the forum as
a result of the commercial activity of those entities to whom the defendant sells
100 Id. (emphasis added).
101 See infra subpart I.B.
102 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
103 Id. at 297-98. At least one other commentator has earlier advocated this approach
by reference to a "vertical stream of commerce traveling from manufacturer to purchaser."
See Burney T. Durham, Note, Long Arm Jurisdiction and Products Liability: Beyond
World-Wide Volkswagen, 11 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 351, 370 (1981). The utility of such a
stream of commerce as contemplated by the Note author above, however, was to locate
those states within which minimum contacts might exist with respect to any prior handler of
the product in the chain: "Any state through which the product passes during this chain
should possess the requisite minimal [sic] contacts to sustain a suit against any prior handler
of the product whether it be manufacturer, distributor, or retailer. Along this entire vertical
chain, any prior handler of the product can be said to have purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in those states through which the product passes." Id. The
utility of the stream of commerce to the present author, on the other hand, is to assess the
purposefulness of activities directed at a given forum by a particular defendant within the
stream of commerce whose amenability is challenged. The "stream of commerce," as thus
articulated, provides a methodology for assessing compliance under the Brennan approach




its product, the stream of commerce continues, and defendant will have made a
market in the particular forum.104
The break in the stream of commerce in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
sufficient to defeat amenability was again quite logical-it was the consumer
activity of the Robinsons. What differentiated the Robinsons from the
Oklahoma distributor and the Oklahoma dealer, who were also customers of
Audi and Volkswagen, is that the Robinsons were consuner customers, not
commercial customers. Hence, their actions in moving the automobile out of
New York constituted unilateral activity which, consistent with Hanson v.
Denckla, could not satisfy the due process requirement of contact with the
forum state.
Thus, under World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., the idea seemed clear: so long
as the person to whom the defendant sells is not a consumer customer, whose
activities in moving the product into the forum state would necessarily be
unilateral, the stream of commerce continues and creates a purposeful
relationship between the defendant and the forum state. With a sale to the
consumer customer, however, the stream of commerce ends. Thus, when
Seaway sold its automobile to the consumer customer Robinson in New York,
the product was taken out of the stream of commerce in New York. While
Seaway and World-Wide Volkswagen certainly would have been amenable in
104 It is this analysis which differs from those "vertical stream of commerce" theories
previously announced. See supra note 103. Rather than conferring an entity status on the
entire chain of distribution such that any distributor within the chain is necessarily amenable
in the forum state if one of them is, this author suggests that the stream of commerce
analysis is only useful to assess the purposeful contacts between a given defendant and the
forum state. It is that focus which distinguishes the majority opinion in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. from the dissents of Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, who
appear to advocate an "upstream" theory of commerce, i.e., if any distributor in the chain
of commerce reaches the particular forum market, then everyone in the chain will be
amenable. Thus, Justice Brennan noted the qualitative value of "a network of other related
dealerships with their service departments" operating "throughout the country under the
protection of the laws of the various States," which "enhances the value of petitioners'
businesses by facilitating their customers' traveling." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444
U.S. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Likewise, Justice Blackmun notes that there is nothing
inherently "unfair" in upholding Oklahoma jurisdiction over the Audi manufacturer and
importer, as well as the New York distributor and the New York dealer, because "[a]l are
in the business of providing vehicles that spread out over the highways of our several
States." Id. at 318 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This author submits that under the majority
view, a court may not look to the commercial conduct of the personfiom whom an object is
distributed, but only to the commercial conduct of the persons to whom an object is
distributed in order to establish a purposeful relationship between a given defendant in the
commercial chain and the forum state. The chain of commerce analysis must always begin
with the defendant whose amenability is questioned, and not with some other producer
higher up in the chain.
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New York, the stream of commerce ended there. As a result, there could be no
amenability of the subject defendants in Oklahoma: "There is no evidence of
record that any automobiles distributed by World Wide are sold to retail
customers outside this tri-state area [of New York, New Jersey and
Connecticut]." 10 5 Seaway, the retail dealer, could not be said to have
conducted activities within the forum state of Oklahoma because the
relationship of its customer (Robinson) to the forum state of Oklahoma was of
utterly no commercial concern. Thus, the decision in World-Wide Vokswagen
Corp. is also consistent with the decision in Kulko. 106 The result is that
unilateral activity of a consumer customer removes the product from the stream
of commerce, i.e., takes the product out of the ordinary course of business, for
purposes of ascertaining minimum contacts. Such a decision again makes a
great deal of sense because the reality is that, once purchased, a product travels
anywhere and everywhere at the whim of the consumer.
A second important feature of the opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. is that it revives the concept of federalism or the principle of
extraterritoriality (power principle), as originated in Pennoyer v. Neff. As the
Court noted, "we have never accepted the proposition that state lines are
irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the
principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution." 10 7 Again,
"the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over the defendant must be
assessed 'in the context of our federal system of government.'" 108 The Court
noted that it was a mistake to assume that the trend away from Pennoyer
heralded the demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts. Those restrictions are necessary as a consequence of the power
principle, which still remains largely intact as a matter of historical
precedent.109 It is for this reason that foreseeability alone does not work; it
105 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 298.
106 The World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. stream of commerce analysis is also consistent
with the targeted effects test of Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); see also supra note
85. Under that test, the defendant writer and editor had engaged in purposeful activity
within the forum state of California when they targeted the particular California plaintiff,
Shirley Jones. When measured, however, by the make-a-market test, it is easy to see that
the article produced by South reached the State of California through a stream of commerce
directed at the forum state: South (writer) to Calder (editor) to National Enquirer, Inc. to
California distributor. Thus, the two theories consistently measure the same end.
107 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
108 Id. at 293-94.
109 The opinion of Justice Scalia in the recent decision of Burnham v. Superior Court,
495 U.S. 604 (1990), reaffirming the constitutionality of transient jurisdiction, also reaffirms
reliance on the Pennoyer principles "traditionally followed by American courts in marking
out the territorial limits of each State's authority" in assessing compliance with the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Id. at 609.
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conflicts with the power principle. A pure reasonableness test based solely on
foreseeability would render virtually every defendant amenable in a plaintiff's
home state, especially with the breadth of today's commercial markets. The
result of World-Wide Volkswagen appears to be that in cases of indirect contact,
due process recognizes the amenability of an absent defendant if that
defendant's activities evidence an intent to make a market in the forum, and the
plaintiff suffers injury to person or property as a result of that defendant's
commercial activity. 110
Beyond World-Wide Volkswagen, there is one additional case which bears
mention. Although typically considered precedential on the subject of general
amenability or general in personam jurisdiction, Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall"' offers notable comment on specific in personam
jurisdiction as well. More particularly, it stands as a reminder to plaintiffs'
counsel that they can concede too much too soon.
Helicopteros concerned a wrongful death action commenced by plaintiff-
survivors and representatives of the decedent employees of a Peruvian
consortium, Corsorcio. The decedent employees were United States citizens
hired to construct a pipeline in Peru. Consorcio was the alter ego of a Texas
joint venture group (Williams-Sedco-Horn) and was formed specifically to
contract with the Peruvian government for the construction of the pipeline. " 2 It
was named a co-defendant together with Helicopteros (Helicol), a Columbian
corporation with its principal place of business in Bogota. Helicol owned
helicopters and engaged in transporting Consorcio personnel to and from the
Peruvian construction site. Helicol and Consorcio had entered into a contract
whereby Helicol would transport the Consorcio personnel, materials, and
equipment in and out of the construction area. The action was commenced in
the Texas courts when one of Helicol's helicopters crashed, killing the United
States citizens. The plaintiffs likely chose Texas because they had the best
chance of obtaining personal jurisdiction over Helicol in Texas, short of suing
the company in Bogota.
Looking at the contacts between Helicol and the state of Texas, the
Supreme Court assessed them as follows: () Helicol sent Restrepo, its chief
executive officer, to Houston to negotiate the terms of the contract, which was
executed in Peru; (2) Helicol purchased eighty percent of its fleet, spare parts
and accessories ($4 million) from a Fort Worth company, Bell Helicopter Co.;
110 This make-a-market theory is reflected in the statutes of states such as Wisconsin,
whose tort long-arm requires either solicitation or service activities carried on within the
state or the presence of products, materials or things "used or consumed within this state in
the ordinary course of trade." Wis. STAT. § 801.05(4)(b) (1992) (emphasis added).
11 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
112 Peruvian law forbade construction of the pipeline by any non-Peruvian entity. See
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410.
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(3) Helicol sent pilots to Fort Worth for training and to fly helicopters from
Fort Worth to Peru; (4) Helicol sent management and maintenance personnel to
Fort Worth for technical training; and (5) Helicol received payments from the
consortium, which were drawn on a Houston bank.
Unfortunately, the plaintiffs conceded the entire issue of specific in
personam jurisdiction when they agreed that their claims against Helicol did not
"arise out of," and were not "related to" Helicol's activities within the State of
Texas.1 13 The parties thus restricted the issue before the Supreme Court to one
of general amenability, which necessitated defendants' continuous and
systematic contacts or continuous and high quality contacts with the State of
Texas. Following counsel's lead, the Supreme Court was careful to "assert no
view" with respect to the relationship between plaintiffs' cause of action and
Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas. 114 With the issue of amenability thus
narrowly confined, the Supreme Court proceeded to examine ad seriatim five
classes of contacts between Helicol and the State of Texas, finding none
sufficient to satisfy the "continuous and systematic" nature of general
amenability, as earlier defined by the landmark case of Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co. 115
Asahi Metal Industry CO. v. Superior Court of California,'16 on the other
hand, is the latest calculated pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the
subject of specific amenability sufficient to confer long-arm jurisdiction. The
action was commenced in the California state courts as a products liability suit
by an injured plaintiff whose motorcycle went out of control following a tire
blowout on a California interstate highway. The California plaintiff was injured
and his passenger-wife was killed. Plaintiff alleged that the accident was caused
by a sudden loss of air and an explosion in the rear tire which was in turn
caused by a defective tire, tube and sealant. Plaintiff's complaint named, among
113 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415.
114 Id. at415 n.10.
115 342 U.S. 437 (1952). That case involved two stockholder actions brought against
the defendant Philippine mining corporation in the state courts of Ohio which were
unrelated to the corporation's activities in that state. The issue thus being one of general
amenability, the United States Supreme Court determined that the corporation was
amenable within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it carried
on "a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business." Id. at 438. Such
contacts included maintenance of a corporate office, directors' meetings and company files
by the president, general manager and principal stockholder of the defendant company
within the forum state of Ohio during the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands;
correspondence and distribution of salaries from such office as well as the supervision of
policies dealing with the rehabilitation of the corporation's Philippine properties; use and
maintenance of Ohio bank accounts bearing corporate funds, and engaging an Ohio bank to
act as transfer agent for corporate stock. Id. at 447-48.
116 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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others, Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co. (Cheng Shin), the Taiwanese
manufacturer of the tube. Asahi Metal Industry Co. Ltd. (Asahi), the
manufacturer of the tube valve assembly, was not named as a defendant by the
California plaintiff. It was joined instead by Cheng Shin, which filed a third-
party complaint seeking indemnification.1 17
Asahi was a Japanese corporation, which manufactured tire valve
assemblies in Japan and sold them to Cheng Shin and to several other tire
manufacturers for use as components in finished tire tubes. Asahi's sales to
Cheng Shin took place exclusively in Taiwan. Cheng Shin in turn bought and
incorporated into its tire tubes the Asahi tire valve assemblies, which products
then were incorporated into cycles that were eventually distributed in
California. Plaintiff's claims against Cheng Shin and the other defendants were
settled and dismissed prior to trial, leaving unresolved only Cheng Shin's
indemnity action against Asahi.
In terms of a World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. make-a-market or stream of
commerce analysis, the chain of commerce for distribution of the defective
valve assembly was as follows: Asahi Metal Industries (manufacturer of the
tube valve assembly) to Cheng Shin (manufacturer of the tire tube) to the
motorcycle manufacturer to the California cycle retailer.
Defendant Asahi attacked the California court's personal jurisdiction over it
by moving to quash service of the summons. The Superior Court of California
found personal jurisdiction, stating that it was not unreasonable for Asahi,
which did business on an international scale, to defend claims of defect on an
international scale. The California Court of Appeals, however, determined that
no personal jurisdiction existed because it would be unreasonable to require
Asahi to appear and defend in California solely on the basis of an ultimately
realized foreseeability that the product containing its component part would be
sold in California. The California Supreme Court, adopting the stream of
commerce theory of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., reversed, ruling that
Asahi's intentional act of placing its components into the stream of commerce,
coupled with awareness that some of the parts would find their way into
California, 118 was sufficient to render it amenable to the California courts.
Thus, Asahi's intentional act of placing its component parts into the stream of
commerce by delivering the components to Cheng Shin in Taiwan, coupled
with Asahi's awareness that some of the components would find their way to
California, was sufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. As
117 See Brief for Petitioner at 2-3, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102 (1987) (No. 85-693).
118 The affidavit of a Cheng Shin manager, whose duties included the purchase of
component parts, averred that Asahi was fully aware that valve stem assemblies sold to
Cheng Shin would eventuate in placement throughout the United States and particularly in
California. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107.
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thus described, the facts are representative of those instances in which a
manufacturer indirectly rather than directly makes a market in the forum state.
Recall that the language of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. premised
amenability upon "the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve,
directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States."1 19 It is this
idea of indirectly making a market that the O'Connor plurality seems to have
eliminated in Asahi, and in doing so, it has severely constrained the substantive
law of strict products liability.
C. The O'Connor Plurality in Asahi: Abrogation of "Indirectly" Making
a Market as a Measure of Minimum Contacts
Consistent with World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., the O'Connor plurality in
Asahi began its analysis of the stream of commerce theory of personal
amenability by acknowledging that the constitutional test of specific jurisdiction
is minimum contacts, and that minimum contacts under the Due Process Clause
requires some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the laws
and protections of the forum state. 120 It also accepted the consumer customer
analysis of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. by pointing out that a consumer's
unilateral act of bringing a defendant's product into the forum state is not a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction under Hanson v. Denckla.121
From that point on, however, the views of Justices O'Connor, Rhenquist,
Powell and Scalia diverge from those of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and
Blackmun on an interpretation of the operation of the stream of commerce
theory. 122 The O'Connor plurality points out that since the decision in World
119 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(emphasis added).
120 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108-09.
121 Id. at 109.
122 Justice Stevens refused to join the opinion of either segment of the Court,
concluding instead that an interpretation of the stream of commerce theory was unnecessary
to the decision since both segments had concluded that the contacts of Asahi were
qualitatively insufficient to support jurisdiction. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102, 121-22 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgement). Having said this, however, Justice Stevens went on to assert that the test
formulated by the O'Connor plurality, even if appropriate, had been misapplied. Id. at 122.
The adequacy of the defendant's contacts with the forum could not be assessed, he argued,
by reference to some "unwavering line" between "mere awareness" and "purposeful
availment." Id. Instead, that assessment would be affected by the "volume, the value and
the hazardous character of the components." Id. In this case, he suggested that the demands
of due process could be satisfied by the defendant's contacts which involved a "regular




Wide Volkswagen Corp., lower courts have been split on the application of the
stream of commerce theory. The nature of the split is that some courts have
understood the Due Process Clause, as interpreted by World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction premised merely on the
fact that a defendant has intentionally placed its product in the stream of
commerce-a theory to which the Brennan plurality adheres. 12 Other courts,
however, have required a defendant to do something more purposefully
directed at the forum state. The latter courts require something more because
they equate placement of the product in the stream of commerce with mere
foreseeability, even though such placement of the product constitutes an
intentional act. Justice O'Connor, adopting the position of these latter courts,
required something more-some additional conduct, which she described as
follows:
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve
the market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the
market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels
for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the
product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the
forum State. 124
Under these criteria, a component parts manufacturer would be amenable
only in those states where it actually sold its parts to the final product
assembler, unless it "create[d], control[ed], or employ[ed] the distribution
system that brought" 125 its product into the forum state. In short, O'Connor
would require in almost all cases some privity between the parties of the
distribution system and the component parts manufacturer before she would
attribute purposefulness to the commercial activity of the component parts
manufacturer. She thus effectively abrogates the concept of an indirect market
by terming purposeful only contact in or directly aimed at a specific forum.
In terms of the specific facts of Asahi, the stream of commerce would
necessarily stop at Cheng Shin. The stream of commerce would continue
beyond the final product assembler only if the component parts manufacturer
sought to establish some form of direct market for its product within the forum
state. Thus, a component parts manufacturer like Asahi can insulate itself from
tort amenability by intentionally utilizing an assembler whose distribution
process it knows will reach a specific market, so long as it does not control the
distribution scheme of that assembler.
123 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117.
124 Id. at 112.
125 Id.
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Likewise, it appears that a component parts manufacturer could insulate
itself by relying exclusively upon a single network of independent distributors
which it knew reached specific markets. 126 This was clearly not the intent of
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.. In terms of available redress, the injured
plaintiff in Asahi would be able to sue Asahi only in Taiwan or Japan, unless
Asahi was generally amenable somewhere else in the United States. In view of
these implications, the O'Connor analysis is troublesome and troubling-
troublesome because it effectively abrogates a right of action for many products
liability plaintiffs against component part manufacturers; troubling because it
was unnecessary to any decision regarding the defendant Asahi's amenability
on a claim for indemnification brought by the defendant and third-party
plaintiff Cheng Shin.
This latter point is fully demonstrated by the analysis adopted by the entire
Court in Part fiB of the Asahi opinion, for it is that analysis which identifies
the underlying problem with Asahi's amenability. The real problem with
Asahi's amenability appears not to have been a lack of purposeful contacts with
the State of California-it was instead the quality of those contacts; that is, the
State of California had a relative disinterest in the indemnity dispute between
two foreign nationals. Furthermore, although the Supreme Court was reluctant
to specifically identify it as such, the Court also appears to have been
influenced by the unrelatedness of the surviving indemnity claim to Asahi's
contacts with California.
As noted earlier, 127 the Supreme Court in International Shoe focused on
two quality indicators which would elevate a given defendant's level of
contacts: state interest in regulating the conduct which gave rise to the cause of
action and the convenience to the defendant of litigating in the chosen
forum.128 The Asahi analysis in Part IB of the opinion is consistent with both
of those factors. Thus, the Court is found discussing the burden on the
defendant (i.e., inconvenience) and the interests of the forum state in providing
relief.
126 C. Hasley v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 235 N.W.2d 446 (Wis. 1975). In a
precedent-setting opinion concerning the amenability of a component parts manufacturer,
decided before World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that
there could come a point at which the intervention of so many parties between the
component parts manufacturer and the retailer would make the imposition of authority over
the component parts manufacturer unfair. On the other hand, the exercise of power over
such a defendant would be fair when there existed "a strong relationship between the
entities" or when "the producer relie[d] solely on a single network of independent
distributors to reach the actual consumer."
12 7 See infra pp. 417-20.
12 8 See infra pp. 419.
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In response to the issue of convenience, the Court points out that the
burden on the defendant Asahi was severe because Asahi was being required to
submit its indemnity dispute with Cheng Shin to a foreign nation's judicial
system. 129 When analyzing the state interest factor, although the Supreme
Court acknowledged California's interest in "'protecting its consumers by
ensuring that foreign manufacturers comply with the state's safety
standards,' 130 it also noted that:
In the present case . . . the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in
California's assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi are slight. All that remains is a
claim for indemnification asserted by Cheng Shin, a Taiwanese corporation,
against Asahi. The transaction on which the indemnification claim is based
took place in Taiwan; Asahi's components were shipped from Japan to
Taiwan. Cheng Shin has not demonstrated that it is more convenient for it to
litigate its indemnification claim against Asahi in California rather than in
Taiwan or Japan. 13
1
Essentially, the Supreme Court suggests that whatever interest the State of
California might have had in affording its injured citizens a forum for relief
against foreign defendants who had caused harm to them is of little or no
consequence when that underlying claim for relief has settled. Put another way,
the arguments in favor of the California consumer lose force when they are
championed by Cheng Shin, a Taiwanese corporation, to support its indemnity
claim against a Japanese corporation. 132 Had the plaintiff undertaken to litigate
129 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
130 Id.
131 Id. A majority of the Supreme Court in Asahi also remarked that California's
legitimate interests in the dispute were "considerably diminished" because the plaintiff was
not a California resident. Id. at 114.
132 The Wisconsin Supreme Court encountered a similar dispute long before World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. or Asahi were decided. In the case of Hasley v. Black, Sivalls &
Bryson, Inc., 235 N.W.2d 446 (Wis. 1975), discussed supra note 126, plaintiffs
commenced an action in negligence and strict liability against the Texas component part
manufacturer of an allegedly faulty "bull plug" (J.B. Smith Manufacturing Company) and
the co-defendant product assembler of an apparatus known as a "horizontal dust scrubber"
(Black, Sivalls & Bryson). Smith answered the complaint denying liability and moved to
dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction. Although the co-defendant Black responded to the
motion to dismiss, plaintiffs did not. Like the Supreme Court in Asahi, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court considered that a state's interest in the action for purposes of deciding
whether the extension of Wisconsin's tort long arm statute over Smith comported with due
process. The court noted that while a state's interest in affording its injured citizens a forum
for relief would ordinarily be of significant weight, that interest was diminished when the
plaintiffs themselves did not assert it:
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its products liability claim against the component parts manufacturer Asahi,
Asahi's contacts in placing its products in the stream of commerce that
eventuated in California would clearly have been of a quality sufficient to
support the related claim. 133 In that instance, California would have had a
substantial interest in allowing the injured California plaintiff to pursue his
claim for redress by the Court's own assessment.
The Supreme Court also appears concerned that the indemnity claim was
decidedly unrelated to Asahi's contacts with the forum state of California and
that the petitioner and third-party plaintiff Cheng Shin was not a California
resident, 134 thereby reducing the interest of the State of California in hearing
The desire in Wisconsin for the protection of the consumer from defective products
may be as strong as the desire in California for protection of its citizens from insurance
industry abuse....
Such a factor may ordinarily be of significant weight. In this case, however, the
plaintiffs have chosen an indifferent posture and have not responded to Smith's
assertion that jurisdiction is lacking. Whether they feel that their interests were perhaps
best protected by their opponent Black, or whether they no longer deem Smith's
presence in the suit a necessity cannot be determined. The arguments in favor of the
Wisconsin conswner lose force in the case when they are championed by Black, a
Texas corporation, against its cross-complaining co-defendant.
Hasley, 235 N.W.2d at 459 (emphasis added).
133 The author is not alone in this view. Professor Andreas Lowenfield of the New
York University School of Law, who helped in the preparation of an amicus brief for
British trade interests in support of Asahi Metal Industries, "predicted that the Court's
outcome would have been different if the claim against Asahi Metal was 'by the guy who
fell off the motorcycle.'" David 0. Stewart, Shortening California's Long Arm, 73 A.B.A.
J. 45, 46 (1987). Professor Lawrence Dessem of the University of Texas Law School
concurred. Id.
134 In Part fiB of the Asal opinion, joined by a majority of the Court, Justice
O'Connor writes: "[b]ecause the plaintiff is not a California resident, California's legitimate
interests in the dispute have considerably diminished." Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987). It should be noted that the Supreme Court was not
referring to the plaintiff Gary Zurcher in this statement. In point of fact, the plaintiff 'Jary
Zurcher and his deceased wife were both residents of California. See Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387 (Cal. 1985). Rather, the Court appears to
have meant the third-party plaintiff Cheng Shin, the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire
tube, whose indemnity claim alone remained. Thus, it is not the plaintiffs lack of residence
which could have informed the Court's analysis.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court had earlier commented in Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984), that a plaintiff's lack of residence in the forum state was
irrelevant to the issue of a given defendant's amenability. In Keeton, the plaintiff
commenced a multi-state libel action in New Hampshire, despite the fact that she was a
resident of New York. Her only connection with New Hampshire was the circulation there
of some 10,000 to 15,000 copies of a magazine she assisted in producing. Id. at 772. The
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had affirmed the district court's order dismissing the
action against Hustler for want of personal jurisdiction, noting that the "petitioner's lack of
contacts with New Hampshire rendered the State's interest in redressing the tort of libel to
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the indemnity dispute. Since even impleaded defendants must be amenable in
the forum state in order to be subject to suit, 135 the relatedness of the claim to
Asahi's contacts likewise provided another basis on which the Supreme Court
could have dismissed the indemnity claim against Asahi without construing (or
misconstruing) the stream of commerce test.
Thus, it is apparent that Asahi's amenability fell, not because of its lack of
purposeful conduct in placing its product in the stream of commerce in
California, but because there was insufficient state interest in deciding the
indemnity dispute once the underlying products liability claim was resolved,
and because Asahi's contacts with the State of California were not related to the
indemnity claim filed against it by Cheng Shin. That is the basis on which
Asahi should have been decided. The O'Connor plurality has misconstrued
what the case was about and appears now to have recreated a wall of the
"citadel" 136 for component parts manufacturers-the plaintiff's hurdle termed
"jurisdictional privity" in this Article.
The position of the O'Connor plurality in Asahi likewise directly confronts
the landmark decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Gray v. American
Radiator & Sanitary Co'p.,137 cited in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. to
support a principle of amenability analogous to the stream of commerce
theory. 138 The facts of the Gray case disclose that defendant Titan Valve, an
Ohio corporation, had sold its products (radiator valves) to American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corporation in Pennsylvania. The valves were
petitioner too attenuated for an assertion of personal jurisdiction over respondent." Id. at
773. As the Supreme Court noted, however:
The plaintiffs residence is not, of course, completely irrelevant to the
jurisdictional inquiry... .Plaintiffs residence may well play an important role in
determining the propriety of entertaining a suit against the defendant in the forum. That
is, plaintiff's residence in the forun may, because of defendant's relationsho with the
plaintiff, enhance defendant's contacts with the forun. Plaintiffs residence may be the
focus of the activities of the defendant out of which the suit arises.... But plaintiffs
3residence in the forum is not a separate requirement, and lack of residence will not
defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of defendant's contacts.
Id. at 780 (emphasis added).
135 See, e.g., 6 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACriCE AND PROCEDURE:
CrviL § 1445 (2d ed. 1990); 3 JAMEs W. MooRn AND RcHARD D. FREER, MooRE's
FEDERAL PRAcncE 14.1812.-2], 14.2811] (2d ed. 1992).
136 See Prosser, supra note 1.
137 176 N.E.2d 761 (l. 1961).
138 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)
("The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts
personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum




incorporated intact into radiator heaters in Pennsylvania and made their way
"in the course of commerce" into Illinois, 139 where one such radiator
exploded, injuring Mrs. Gray. Unlike the Asahi plaintiff Gary Zurcher, Mrs.
Gray sued as co-defendants both American Radiator and Titan Valve.
American Radiator then cross-claimed for indemnification against Titan Valve.
Mrs. Gray, however, continued to litigate her products liability claim against
Titan Valve to trial.
What was remarkable about the Gray case in 1961 was that there had been
no direct activity by Titan Valve of Ohio in the State of Illinois. Instead,
thousands of valves were sold by Titan Valve to American Radiator in
Pennsylvania. American Radiator, like Cheng Shin, was a separate and
independent company in which Titan Valve had no control or interest. Thus
Titan Valve occupied the same posture with regard to American Radiator that
Asahi occupied with respect to Cheng Shin. Yet the Illinois Supreme Court
found Titan Valve amenable in the State of Illinois.
Although utilizing a stream of commerce rationale to assess fairness, the
Illinois Supreme Court articulated no World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. stream of
commerce theory as the basis for its decision. Instead, it simply reasoned that
"the use of such products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient
contact with this State to justify a requirement that he [a defendant] defend
here." 140 Thus, it found that the extension of the Illinois local tort long-arm
statute over Titan Valve was consistent with due process. It also found,
however, that the terms of the Illinois local tort long-arm statute were met since
the tort was committed in Illinois. That is, there existed a local tortious act, by
virtue of the fact that the "place of wrong is the place where the last event takes
place which is necessary to render the [defendant] liable." 141 Since the last
event was the injury, which occurred in Illinois, the court reasoned that the tort
was in fact committed in Illinois.
The importance of Gray lay both in its determination that Titan Valve was
amenable as well as its predictive policy language:
Where the alleged liability arises, as in this case, from the manufacture of
products presumably sold in contemplation of use here, it should not matter
that the purchase was made from an independent middleman or that someone
other than the defendant shipped the product into this State ....
As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its products for
ultimate use in another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any
damage caused by defects in those products .... 142
139 Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
140 Id. at 766.
141 Id. at 762-63.
142 Id. at 766.
[Vol. 54:403
JURISDICTIONAL PRIVITY
Thus, the Illinois high court reasoned that Titan Valve had indirectly engaged
in activities of a minimum kind in that state which were constitutionally
sufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it by the Illinois
courts. The result in Gray therefore coincided with the constitutional
justification later articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. Of course, there
is now serious question whether the Gray situation would survive O'Connor's
stream of commerce analysis in Asahi.
More importantly, the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Gray was
an attempt by that court to bring long-arm jurisdiction into harmony with the
developing principles of products liability. In particular, it was important that
Mrs. Gray, who was injured in Illinois, be allowed to pursue her claim for
injury against the component part manufacturer Titan Valve-the only party
who might be liable under negligence principles. In terms of product liability
law, the Illinois Supreme Court did not want the artificial structure of the
distribution or marketing chain to interfere with the substantial rights of its
injured citizen. Essentially, the component parts manufacturer in Gray asserts a
jurisdictional challenge which the court rejects by resorting to the tort
principles later adopted in section 402A of the Restatement.
m. THE PRODUCTS LIABILIY DmEMMA UNDER ASAHI: A RiGHT
WrrHOUT A REMEDY
A. The Origin and Intent of Restatement Section 402A
A plaintiff who has suffered physical harm to person or property caused by
a defective product has a choice of three legal theories under which to proceed:
negligence in tort, strict liability for breach of warranty, and strict liability in
tort.143 Historically, the theories of tort negligence and strict liability in
warranty limited liability of manufacturers whose products caused injury by
requiring that the injured plaintiff and the defendant manufacturer be in privity
of contract. The seminal case of Winterbottom v. Wright,' 44 for example, was
interpreted as authority for the proposition that no action would lie, even in
tort, "for the misperformance of a contract of sale of a chattel in the first
instance." 145 As courts increasingly adhered to that principle, the general rule
evolved that "an original seller of goods was not liable for damages caused by
their defects to anyone except his immediate buyer, or one in privity with
143 See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 101 (5th ed. 1984).
144 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
145 KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, § 96, at 681.
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him." 146 This rule was supported by a policy determination that whatever the
negligence of the manufacturer, the manufacturer was insulated by the
intervening sale to a distributor or retailer.1 47 Another policy supporting the
rule could be found in the language of the Winterbottom decision itself:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can
sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was
injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we
confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into
them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no
limit, would ensue. 148
Thus, a concern prevailed that it would be too burdensome to hold
manufacturers and sellers responsible to persons whose identity they could not
know. 149 Historically, therefore, a manufacturer could immunize itself from
tort liability by making a contract for the sale or distribution of its product with
some third party, which transaction intervened between the manufacturer and
the consumer.
Likewise, early on, persons who suffered physical injury to person or
property caused by a defective product seldom recovered on a breach of
warranty theory. Authorities cite two predominant reasons: (1) parties were
free to contract out any liability which might result from objective indicia of
their intent to guarantee against product defects, and (2) recovery was limited
by contract law only to those persons who were privy to the contract of product
purchase. 150
With the landmark decisions of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 151 in
1916 and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 152 decided in 1960, the
146 Id. (footnotes omitted).
147 Id.
148 Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405 (Abingier, C.B.).
149 KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, § 96, at 682.
150 Id. at 684.
151 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). Concerned there with the liability of a manufacturer
of an automobile which had sold its product to a retailer who then resold it to the plaintiff,
complete with a defective wheel purchased in turn from a third-party supplier, Justice
Cardozo hurdled the requirement of privity, finding the manufacturer liable to the injured
plaintiff in negligence. Justice Cardozo concluded that the manufacturer's duty to inspect
extended beyond "things which in their normal operation are implements of destruction" to
those things whose nature is such "that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril
when negligently made." Id. at 1053.
152 161 A.2d 69, 84 (N.J. 1960) ("Accordingly, we hold that under modem marketing
conditions, when a manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream of trade and promotes
its purchase by the public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such
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requirements of privity were largely abrogated in the negligence and breach of
warranty theories, except to the extent that they are now controlled by
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.1 53 The doctrine of strict liability
in tort for the production of defective products causing injury developed on the
heels of the Henningsen decision and completely abrogated the requirement of
proof of any contractual relationship between the parties.
Following Henningsen, the California Supreme Court became the first to
impose tort liability upon a manufacturer under the doctrine of strict liability.
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,154 plaintiff sued the retailer and
manufacturer of a combination power tool for damages suffered when a piece
of wood was thrown by the tool, striking him in the head. At trial, plaintiff had
introduced expert testimony that the tool was defectively designed and that
certain design changes would have prevented the accident. On appeal of
adverse jury findings by both the plaintiff and the manufacturer, the California
Supreme Court affirmed the jury award for the plaintiff as against the
manufacturer, noting that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an
article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection
for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." 155
Summarizing the policy choice made by the court in imposing strict liability,
Justice Traynor stated, "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs
of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves." 156
Responding to this trend, the American Law Institute drafted and adopted
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 402A provides, in
pertinent part, that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 157
The adoption of this principle of strict liability in tort by both the Restatement
and the California Supreme Court had virtually an immediate impact on many
courts. It prompted their recognition of the principle of strict liability in tort
accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. Absence of agency between the
manufacturer and the dealer who makes the ultimate sale is immaterial.")
153 See U.C.C. § 2-318.
154 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (en bane).
155 Id. at 900.
156 Id. at 901.
157 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFToRTS § 402A (1965).
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and the abandonment of earlier attempts to impose strict liability within the
framework of contract warranty.
The applicability of strict liability in tort to component part manufacturers
was not so clear, as evidenced by the comments and caveats accompanying
Section 402A. Caveat (3), for example, expressly reserves any opinion
regarding the Section's applicability to component part manufacturers.
Likewise, Comment q reasons that "in the absence of a sufficient number of
decisions on the matter to justify a conclusion, the Institute expresses no
opinion on the matter." 158 Nevertheless, that same Comment suggests that
"where there is no change in the component part itself, but it is merely
incorporated into something larger," strict liability should carry through to the
ultimate consumer. 159 Thus, in a majority of jurisdictions, an injured plaintiff
may recover against a component part manufacturer in strict liability if the
plaintiff proves "that the product in question was unreasonably dangerous, that
the condition or defect was in the product when sold by the manufacturer, that
the assembler made no substantial change in the component, and that the injury
was directly attributable to a condition or defect in the component part
itself." 160 As with the evolution of product liability law founded on the theory
of negligence and breach of warranty, there is no requirement of contract
privity between the ultimate consumer and the component part manufacturer or
any distributor in the chain.
Even in those decisions which invoke Caveat (3) to support a decision
withholding strict product liability where an action lies as against the
manufacturer or assembler of the complete product, 161 there is no corollary for
concluding that a component part manufacturer cannot be held liable under the
Restatement when relief is not available from those other sources. 162 This
158 Id. § 402A cmt. q.
159 Id.
160 1 AMERICAN LAW oFPRoDUCrs LIABILrrY § 8:12, at 20 (Timothy E. Travers et al.
eds., 3d ed. 1987); see also 1 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCrS LIABILrrY § 3.22, at 84-85
(2d ed. 1988); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (IlM. 1965). Relying
heavily on Greenman and section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Illinois
Supreme Court in Suvada concluded that it could "see no reasons" why the manufacturer of
a defective brake system, which the seller installed in reconditioning a used tractor, "should
not come within the rule of strict liability." Id.
161 See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 191 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 1963), in
which the court found that no strict liability in tort should lie against the manufacturer of an
allegedly defective airplane altimeter. The court reasoned that "for the present at least we
do not think it necessary so to extend this rule as to hold liable the manufacturer. . . of a
component part. Adequate protection is provided for the passengers by casting in liability
the airplane manufacturer which put into the market the completed aircraft." Id. at 83.
162 1 MADDEN, supra note 160, § 3.22, at 84-85.
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could occur, for example, because of insolvency on the part of the product
assembler.
B. Repercussions of Jurisdictional Privity
By infusing the requirement of jurisdictional privity into a plaintiff's ability
to sue directly a component part manufacturer, a plurality of the United States
Supreme Court has allowed the component part manufacturer to effectively
immunize itself from suit by an injured plaintiff-even in those situations where
it is the only solvent source of relief. The Court has protected a component part
manufacturer from liability by means of jurisdictional privity, where once a
manufacturer or component part manufacturer was immune from liability by
virtue of the requirement of contract privity. Thus, in a very real sense,
jurisdictional privity replaces contract privity in those situations where a
component part manufacturer intends only an indirect market for its product in
the forum where the plaintiff was injured.
The synergy developed between the law of products liability, as codified in
the Restatement, and personal jurisdiction, as interpreted in such cases as Gray
v. American Radiator,163 has now been not so neatly undone by a plurality of
the Supreme Court in Asahi. The implications are startling. In a domestic
dispute between an injured plaintiff and a component part manufacturer, the
injured plaintiff can bring suit only in those states where the component part
manufacturer is domiciled or establishes a direct market for its product.
Presumably, amenability could thus be found in the state in which the part
manufacturer sells its parts to the product assembler. At best, this is
inconvenient to the plaintiff, but at least there is viability to the claim since it
can be tried in an American court. A foreign component part manufacturer
such as Asahi Metal Industries, on the other hand, can distribute its parts to a
foreign product assembler, knowing full well and intending that the final
product and its parts reach a lucrative market in the United States. Yet because
of the infusion of a foreign distributor into the process, it remains immune
from liability because the long-arm of United States courts cannot
constitutionally reach it. The synergy between developing product liability law
and the power of the courts to hear such claims has been ruptured.164 As a
163 176 N.E.2d 761 (Dl. 1961).
164 Perhaps the reconstruction of the citadel as described in this Article is simply
reflective of a recent period of stabilization in tort law and the "mild contraction of
doctrine" recently debated by a number of torts scholars. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The
Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modem American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv.
601, 700 (1992).
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matter of international foreign policy, the result may or may not be
defensible. 165 As a matter of domestic tort policy, clearly it is not.
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to Asahi, the threshold inquiry for most courts confronted by the
issue of component part manufacturer liability was "whether the article
produced by the component manufacturer 'is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was
sold.' 166 Intentional placement of the article in the stream of commerce, such
that it reached the forum state in the ordinary course of trade, supported
expanded notions of liability with corresponding forum ability to hear the case
against the manufacturer. Now, however, there has evolved a need to scrutinize
the nature of the chain of commercial distribution by which the article reaches
the user or consumer. Where once a chain of distribution marked by the
constraints of contract privity precluded recovery by consumers injured by
those products, there is now interposed a concept of jurisdictional privity
between a component parts manufacturer and the forum state, which does
essentially the same thing. Thus, forum states may once again allow the
artificial structure of a distribution chain to defeat the substantive rights of their
injured citizens.
165 At least one author has noted that Justice O'Connor's restrictive view of
amenability provides foreign manufacturers with a competitive edge over their domestic
counterparts. He argues that the direct contact requirement "removes from domestic court
jurisdiction foreign manufacturers whose only contacts are indirect forum sales. Foreign
manufacturers, thus freed from litigation expenses, would benefit from lower costs. As a
result, foreign producers could potentially enjoy a competitive advantage over United States
manufacturers in both the domestic and international marketplace." Erik T. Moe,
Comment, Asahi and the Stream of Connerce Doctrine, 76 GEO. L.J. 203, 223 (1987).
166 1 MADDEN, supra note 160, at 85.
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